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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a hypothetical state.  We will call it Calore, newly admit-
ted splitting off from California and Oregon.
Calore is a politically moderate state, given its derivation from the
northern, and relatively conservative, part of California and the
coastal, and relatively progressive, part of Oregon.  In fact, given its
roots, Calore is a good example of the fiscally moderate and socially
liberal viewpoint so many politicians claim to possess.1
Given this political landscape, the people of Calore (colloquially re-
ferred to as “Calormen”) decide to legalize (and tax receipts on the sale
of) a wide variety of drugs that are illegal to possess, consume, or sell
in neighboring states.  They do so by amending the Calore Constitu-
tion by voter initiative (with the proposed amendment referred to as
“Amendment 3”).
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1. But that none, in truth, seem to actually possess.
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Prior to the vote, there was a robust public debate.  Conservative
members of Calore decried both the moral failings often associated
with drug use and the negative economic externalities accompanying
widespread drug usage.  A coalition of libertarians and progressives
lauded the freedom of choice inherent in drug liberalization and the
increased tax receipts the state might reap.  After the debate played
out (including significant contributions and participation by inter-
ested parties from outside Calore), the people voted on the issue at a
duly held general election.  The debate sparked a large turnout of over
60%, and voters overwhelmingly approved Amendment 3 by a vote of
65% to 35%.
Shortly thereafter, a new (and relatively newly appointed) bureau-
crat in Calore’s State Comptroller’s Office2 issued Letter Ruling
5.23.1(a)(ii), which concluded that Amendment 3 was contrary to a su-
perseding provision of the Calore Constitution (as interpreted by said
bureaucrat) and that, as such, it was null and void.  This Letter Rul-
ing, bearing the imprimatur of an official Finding of the Comptroller’s
Office, became administrative law, and all state employees (including
police officers) immediately began enforcing it.
The voters for Amendment 3 cried foul, but the State of Calore was
unmoved.  Majority rule be damned, Amendment 3 was overturned
because of the interpretation of an arcane set of rules issued by an
appointed, low-level official.
What do you think of this narrative?  Should a large majority of
citizens have their voice silenced by a single, unelected government
official?  Do you think that superseding rules and laws should be
respected and honored, no matter the circumstances?  Or are you per-
haps agnostic about the particulars of this case but troubled by the
process by which Amendment 3 was disposed?
Whatever your view, this hypothetical is not far-fetched.  This hap-
pens throughout the country, and it happens regularly.
Take a recent example from Utah.  In 1995, Utah became the first
state to pass a bill prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages
performed in other states and nations.3  Thereafter, in 2004, Utah vot-
2. This bureaucrat has the title of Third Designee in Charge of the Fifteenth Divi-
sion of Accounting Regulatory Issues of the Comptroller.  These sorts of titles
make social standing and importance difficult to determine, but it is apparent to
everyone that this fellow is not important because he only has one security detail
and one car in his retinue, very low numbers for the Comptroller’s Office.
3. See Husband and Wife—Recognition of Marriages Act, 1995 Utah Laws ch. 146
(H.B. 366) (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4 (West 2014)).  The
law arose from the “Recognition of Marriages” bill, passed in response to the
Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996) decision on same-sex marriage from
Hawaii, primarily as an attempt to address “a deficiency in Utah’s laws [that]
might require the state to recognize” unions performed outside the state.  Karen
Snow, Law Professor Defends Marriage in Same-Sex Marriage Battle, BYU MAG.,
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ers approved a ballot referendum on Utah Constitutional Amendment
3, which defined marriage as the legal union between a man and a
woman and which restricted unmarried civil unions.4  This referen-
dum was approved by 65.9% of those who voted on it.5  This means
that 593,297 Utah citizens (of the approximately 900,000 who voted)
voted to approve the amendment.6
That majority held until 2013.  In March, three couples, including
one previously married in Iowa, filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, arguing that Amendment 3 violated the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Con-
stitution.7  On December 20, 2013, the court ruled the amendment
was unconstitutional, with District Judge Robert Shelby expressing
his opinion that Amendment 3 “does not . . . elevate the status of oppo-
site-sex marriage; it merely demeans the dignity of same-sex
couples.”8  Thus, one man overturned the vote of nearly 600,000
people.9
Obviously, gay marriage is a topical, and controversial, issue.10
Ultimately, this Article has nothing to say about that issue.
Spring 1997, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/89D8-JLMD.  “The bill was
brought to the floor just minutes before midnight, after . . . [being] lifted . . . from
the bottom of the Senate calendar.  It passed 24 to 1.” Utah Won’t Accept Same-
Sex Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995.
4. H.R.J. Res. 25, 55th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004) (proposing amendment: UTAH
CONST. art. 1, § 29, approved in the general election on November 2, 2004, and
effective on January 1, 2005).
5. 2004 UTAH GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1, 30 (2004), http://elections.utah.gov/
Media/Default/Documents/Election_Results/General/2004Gen.pdf, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/7LA8-AEET.
6. Id.
7. See generally Complaint, Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah
2013) (No. 2:13-cv-00217-RJS), 2013 WL 1287377.
8. Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
9. I practiced law in Utah for nearly ten years prior to teaching and had some glanc-
ing familiarity with Judge Shelby prior to his elevation to the federal bench.  It is
that familiarity that sparked my interest in this topic and that ultimately led to
the writing of this Article.
10. It is probably unnecessary to cite to anything for the proposition that gay mar-
riage is topical.  It is, however, necessary to cite to authority for the proposition
that gay marriage is controversial.  Media coverage is nearly universally positive,
so it may come as a surprise that this is an issue that still divides public opinion.
Since 1996, public view has gradually shifted from opposing same-sex marriage
to supporting it, albeit by a small margin. See Michael Muskal, Gallup Poll:
Same-Sex Marriage Support at New High, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014), http://www
.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-poll-majority-americans-support-same-
sex-marriage-20140521-story.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8LJ3-3M
TF.  A relatively recent New York Times article looked at various polling numbers
from 2013 and determined that “support for same-sex marriage now exceeds op-
position to it,” but that majority support was a slim one of only 51%.  Nate Silver,
How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Is Changing, and What It Means, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-
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Instead, this Article seeks to examine the process that occurred in
Utah, and which occurs regularly throughout the country in a wide
variety of circumstances.  We take it for granted that courts are the
ultimate arbiters of justice and equity, but does it really make sense
that one person (or cabal of people) should overrule a whole state?  If
so, when does that make sense?  This Article attempts to tackle these
questions and ultimately argues that more people should be troubled
by cases like this (whatever your personal views) and by the role that
courts often take upon themselves.
This is because, in the end, courts risk losing legitimacy if they
deviate too far from perceived social and cultural norms when ad-
dressing legal issues.  Such a limitation is fundamental to the nature
of our legal system and is baked into the American jurisprudential
system.  Our courts ignore it at our peril.
The nature of this limitation can be seen when one looks at our
legal system in a broader context.  Part I begins by examining our
mechanisms of enforcement.  In America, laws are enforced by force or
by consent.  Though a rough statement encompassing many facets of
legal, ethical, and even moral behavior, that is essentially what laws
reduce to: actors11 follow laws either because they choose to do so vol-
untarily or because they are compelled to do so by force.12  This is in-
teresting (and relevant) because, while most laws are enforced by both
force and consent, court rulings and directions are generally enforced
by consent.  Indeed, court rulings and judge-made law function almost
entirely because our society chooses to follow and obey them.
opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/E9CH-4D9U.  The article suggests that a number of contro-
versial and complex issues complicate same-sex marriage polling, including the
“increasing variety of propositions relat[ed] to same-sex marriage on the ballots,
from those that seek to ban it . . . to those that ask voters to approve it . . . to those
that would alter the state constitution . . . [and] whether or not civil unions were
also included.” Id.  Based on historical polling patterns, the article predicts sup-
port to continue to grow by “one and a half percentage points nationally per year.”
Id.
11. Those subject to American laws include citizens, residents, natural persons, busi-
ness entities, and, potentially, any legally recognized “person” anywhere in the
world. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002 (West 2012) (identifying which
business entities are subject to franchise tax in Texas); Estate of Casimir ex rel. v.
New Jersey, No. 09-4004, 2009 WL 2778392, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2009) (“A
person found within the United States cannot somehow exempt himself or immu-
nize himself from the application of state or federal law by declaring himself a
non-citizen or diplomat.”).
12. “Force” is a broad concept, but so is its application.  You may pay your taxes be-
cause you truly believe in the American Experiment and really believe, in your
heart of hearts, that the U.S. Government will use those funds wisely.  Most peo-
ple, though, probably pay because they fear the penalties arising from nonpay-
ment—penalties which are enforced by force, or a threat thereof.
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The consensual nature of court-created law has a number of conse-
quences.  Most relevant here is that the cooperative relationship that
exists between the law-giver and the law-follower ultimately requires
the law-giver to take into account the views of the law-follower.  When
put generically, this proposition seems relatively uncontroversial, but
Part II explores it in depth and reaches the relatively surprising con-
clusion that courts follow legal actors as much, or more, than the other
way around.  This is surprising because it inverts our general view of
the way that laws work.  Indeed, though we usually view courts as
helping to craft and enforce society’s agenda, courts actually act
within a broader spectrum of social norms.  This means, as is dis-
cussed in Part III, that courts that ignore (or exceed) these norms risk
their very legitimacy (and, ultimately, whatever “cause” they seek to
champion).
The Article concludes, then, that courts must be ever mindful of
their role in our society and always cognizant of social norms and mo-
res, and that they fail to do so to the peril of their own prerogatives
and legitimacy.
II. THE GUN OR THE SALUTE
Most Americans take law enforcement for granted.  Certainly, in
academic settings, most scholars spend their time arguing about what
the law should be or why the law is the way it is—few spend much
time contemplating the pedestrian issue of whether or not rules are
actually followed.  They presume that people either follow the law or
suffer punishment.13  Here, though, it is important to spend a bit
more time on this basic proposition.
Why is it, exactly, that people follow the law?  Obviously, there are
a host of reasons (moral, ethical, social, etc.).  In large part, however,
people follow the law for one of two reasons: either they are forced to
13. Indeed, the very phrase “force of law” presupposes that laws have some inherent
ability to compel compliance.  There are, of course, some exceptions to this gen-
eral point of view. See, e.g., John Alan Cohan, Civil Disobedience and the Neces-
sity Defense, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 111, 111 (2007) (“Civil disobedience is a form of
protest that, while usually peaceful, involves violating the law—usually by tres-
passing on government property, blocking access to buildings, or engaging in dis-
orderly conduct.”); Frank Menetrez, Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation,
and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REV. 859, 860 (2000) (“An effi-
cient breach of contract is a breach that will, in some economically defined sense,
make society better off—it will lead to a more efficient use or allocation of re-
sources.”).  However, generally speaking, the concept that people may simply not
follow the law is excluded from most scholarly consideration, probably, in part,
because it would not feel very useful to spend an entire article propounding a
view of the law only to ultimately acknowledge that such vehemence is not likely
to affect anyone’s actual behavior.
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do so, or they choose to do so—either they bow to the gun or they sa-
lute the flag.
Of course, voluntary compliance is not unique to the courts.  Much
of our system of American democracy is staked upon society’s willing-
ness to follow the rules.14  Without its citizens agreeing to do so, the
polity would fall apart under the burden of enforcement.15  Certainly,
this does not mean that there is never controversy surrounding the
promulgation or enforcement of laws.  No law will please all of the
people all of the time.  But our system has been constructed with this
difficulty in mind.  Representative democracy dictates that the major-
ity will elect representatives who will, eventually, reflect the “general
will.”16
The alternative to this voluntary compliance (the salute) is en-
forced compliance (the gun).  Many rules are enforced at the point of a
gun.17  When you pay taxes, for instance, you do so for fear of prison
(to which you will be escorted by a man with a gun).  Similarly, when
you refrain from attacking the driver who cuts you off, you do so for
fear of prison (or worse).  Indeed, even when you register your car, you
do so for fear that you may be fined or go to jail or have your car
taken—all of which will be enforced by a man with a gun.  Consent
14. “The heart of the democratic faith is government by the consent of the governed.”
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 27 (1962).
15. See Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERN-
MENT (Legal Classics Library, Division of Gryphon Editions 1994) (1690) (indicat-
ing that government, in order to be legitimate, must have the consent of the
governed).  In fact, that consent is at the very heart of our system, which is, at its
most basic, a contract between the governed and the governors. See JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 264 (Legal Classics Library Special Edition
1994) (1690).  Put more articulately:
But though Men when they enter into Society, give up the Equality, Lib-
erty, and Executive Power they had in the State of Nature, into the
hands of the Society, to be so far disposed of by the Legislative, as the
good of the Society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in
every one the better to preserve himself his Liberty and Property; (For
no rational Creature can be supposed to change his condition with an
intention to be worse) the power of the Society, or Legislative, consti-
tuted by them, can never be suppos’d to extend farther than the common
good; but is obliged to secure every ones Property by providing against
[defects of Nature] that made the State of Nature so unsage and uneasie.
Id. at 264–65.
16. See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 265 (“And so whoever has the Legislative or Su-
preme Power of any Commonwealth, is bound to govern by establish’d standing
Laws, promulgated and known to the People and not by Extermporary Decrees;
by indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies by those
Laws . . . And all this to be directed to not other end, but the Peace Safety, and
publick good of the People.”).
17. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Con-
sent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479 (2012).
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and force are not necessarily mutually exclusive,18 and most of us do
not dwell on the governmental threat hanging over our heads.  Never-
theless, it is unavoidably the case that legislative and executive rules
significantly rely on the omnipresent threat of physical violence.19
There is nothing wrong with either method of enforcement.
Neither force nor acquiescence is inherently superior to the other, and
both ultimately contribute to a more just and verdant society.20  The
distinction is interesting here, though, because compliance with judge-
made law is overwhelmingly voluntary.
“Ultimately courts depend upon federal executive or legislative
support in order to see that judicial orders and policies are carried
out.”21  This is because the courts have no direct form of control over
the public.22  Indeed, even the Supreme Court of the United States,
the highest judicial authority, relies on the voluntary compliance of
18. See id. at 486 (“The existence of consent . . . does not preclude the existence of
force.  Already at the time of consent, there is always a question of whether the
consent was induced by force.  Afterward, moreover, the government often relies
on force—indeed, the force of law—to implement its conditions.”).
19. See id. at 490 (“[M]any conditions, most clearly those that are regulatory or that
bind into the future, are backed with constitutionally significant government
force.”); cf. Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Pro-
cess, 100 VA. L. REV. 183 (2014) (discussing America’s extraordinary incarcera-
tion rates); Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement,
127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (discussing the role of fines and penalties in our
legal system).  This is a long-standing element of the American legal system.  In
1832, for example, Andrew Jackson “asked Congress to empower him to use force
to execute federal law” in order to combat nullification efforts of several southern
state legislatures. Andrew Jackson Denounces Nullification in a Presidential
Proclamation, DIGITAL HIST. (2012), http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_text
book.cfm?smtID=3&psid=371, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JG4J-7QYE.
Congress promptly did so. Id.
20. “Government, by accreting to itself a monopoly of force, removes from other agen-
cies of society the possibility of equating right with might.”  Symposium, Looking
Backward, Looking Forward: The Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor, From the Stanford Archives, Chapter IV: The Moral Basis of Individ-
ual Rights, 58 STAN. L. REV. 2028, 2035 (2006).
Thus we have here two basically opposite tendencies of government,
both of which endear it to men.  One is that it increases ability and op-
portunity, the other is that it represents the possibility of achieving a
state of affairs where force is not the solution to all questions.  This lat-
ter state of affairs can be achieved, however, only by the state exercising
moral as well as physical self-limitation upon itself.  When it fails to do
this, might once more equals right.
Id. at 2036.
21. Barry Freidman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 768 (1992) [hereinafter Federal Remedies].
22. Courts have no armies, police, or budgetary authority that would permit them to
forcefully effect their rulings. See Ralph George Elliot, Public Trust Is a Fragile
Bond, 77 CONN. B.J. 41, 42 (2003) (“The Judicial Branch . . . has neither the
power of the purse nor the personnel to implement its decisions.”).
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the public.23  The primary exception to this concept relates to a court’s
ability to find parties in contempt, but even this power is relatively
benign and does not ultimately grant courts significant, direct control
of citizen behavior.24  Ultimately, courts are toothless.25
Voluntary compliance is relevant here because it greatly affects
how the courts and the public interact.  In the context of judge-made
law, society is markedly divorced from its creation and promulgation.
Elsewhere, the citizenry has a direct stake in the mechanisms of the
law, so it seems relatively just and straightforward for the citizenry to
willingly participate in the execution of the same.26  In the case of
23. Without it, the Supreme Court (like all courts) must appeal to the help of the
other branches of government. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Compliance with decisions of this Court, as the
constitutional organ of the supreme Law of the Land, has often, throughout our
history, depended on active support by state and local authorities.  It presupposes
such support.”). Cooper is illustrative.  There, legal action began because a local
school district asked for extra time to implement a judicially-approved school in-
tegration plan. Id. at 4.  The Supreme Court declined but was not able to enforce
the original order, and compliance was ultimately enforced only when the Presi-
dent sent in troops. See Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 24,
1957).  In effect, all court orders are more or less analogous to civil judgments:
they are pronouncements that may or may not be enforced.
24. “[C]ourts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders
through civil contempt.”  Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).  In
fact, some states statutorily designate ignoring a court order as civil contempt.
E.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21 (2015).  And there is no question that courts at all
levels attempt to utilize this power to control parties and enforce their rulings.
E.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990).  In Spallone, the lower court
issued a negative injunction disallowing discriminatory housing practices and re-
quiring the municipality to build low-income housing. Id. at 268–69.  The city
undertook some steps to comply but ultimately abandoned its efforts. Id. at
270–71.  The court imposed contempt citations, escalating daily fines for the mu-
nicipality, and daily fines and imprisonment for noncompliant councilmembers.
Id. at 271–72.  The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed
the concept of fines and contempt (though they modified the lower court’s orders
significantly). See id. at 272, 280.  However, as Spallone itself makes clear, this
is not an ideal method of enforcement.  If “justice delayed is justice denied,” then,
surely, an enforcement mechanism that takes years to come to fruition is lacking.
See id. (deciding this case more than two years after the initial contempt order).
Moreover, even a swiftly effected contempt order can simply be denied unless it is
enforced by another branch of government with the actual ability to impose force
upon recalcitrant parties. See supra note 23.  As such, contempt is not a signifi-
cant exception to the powerlessness of courts.
25. This impotence was famously driven home by President Jackson’s well-known
response to the case of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832): “John Marshall
has made his decision; now let him enforce it.” See Elliot, supra note 22, at 41.  In
fact, this reliance leaves the courts fundamentally exposed to the pressures of the
other branches of government. See Federal Remedies, supra note 21, at 778 (cit-
ing Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan as an example of the judiciary’s vulnerability).
26. See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 22, at 41; Federal Remedies, supra note 21, at 778.
Note that these sources generally refer to statutory constructs, which flow from
the legislature, which flow from the citizenry.  Of course, this connection is often
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judge-made law, however, this just is not so.  Judges are appointed by
politicians who are answerable to the body politic, but, once ap-
pointed, they are largely insulated from the public.27  The very area of
the law, then, that calls for the least amount of public participation is
that area that requests the most obeisance.  As is discussed at length
in Part III, this means that courts must generally remain cognizant of
public attitudes and preferences if they are to maintain their role and
law-making credibility.28
III. THE LIMITS OF VOLUNTEERISM
Broadly speaking, the role of courts in our society is well under-
stood and not particularly controversial.  There is room for a variety of
opinion as to how courts perform that function, but the concept that
judges have historically acted to protect fundamental rights against a
tyranny of the majority is well accepted.  This has often placed courts
in opposition to large swaths of the public, but not to the extent one
would perhaps expect.  The reason for this unexpected harmony is the
voluntary nature of judge-made law, discussed above.
attenuated (particularly in the case of regulations arising from the executive
power).  However, the principle generally holds that much of society’s willingness
to follow rules and regulations relates to the rules and regulations that society
can directly affect.
27. This is not universal, in that some judges are elected, not appointed. See Cynthia
Kelly, Testimony by Cynthia Kelly Before the Joint Select Committee on the Judi-
ciary of the Texas Legislature, 72 JUDICATURE 158 (May 27, 1988) (delivered in
Austin, Texas) (“[Forty] states select at least some of their judges through elec-
tions—either partisan, nonpartisan, or retention—which means that almost 80
per cent of our nation’s judges will participate in an election campaign at some
point during their judicial careers.”).  However, there is some reason to believe
that, even under such circumstances, judges remain removed from the public.
See Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare Majorities Rule on Courts?, 123
YALE L.J. 1692, n.62 (2014) (“[E]ven in jurisdictions where judges are elected, we
have no theory of representation that allows judges’ votes to reflect the utility-
prospects of those who elected them.”). But see Sandra Day O’Connor, The Essen-
tials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan, 74 MO. L. REV. 479, 484 (2009) (not-
ing Roscoe Pound’s well-known complaint that “putting courts into politics and
compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost de-
stroyed the traditional respect for the bench”) (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729,
748 (1906))).
28. The concept is commonly referred to as “buy-in.” See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedu-
ral Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 286
(2003) (discussing the efficacy of police officials “gain[ing] the cooperation of the
people with whom they deal” because doing so “facilitate[s] immediate acceptance
and long-term compliance”).  Buy-in is important in many contexts because
“[p]eople are more likely to adhere to agreements and follow rules over time when
they ‘buy into’ the decisions and directives of legal authorities.” Id.
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It would be a wonderful thing, no doubt, to have everyone jump at
your every word and be ever eager to do your bidding.29  This is not,
however, how the world works.  People are not ever-pliable entities,
willing to do whatever they are told, no matter how little they like it or
how little it makes sense to them.  This means that, unless you have
the wherewithal to enforce compliance, you must reach some sort of
accommodation with those whom you govern.  As is discussed below,
courts have traditionally understood this because they have histori-
cally appreciated the voluntary nature of society’s compliance with
their rulings and how that affects their role in society.30
The courts serve as a guard against the majoritarian, public pres-
sures that flow through the legislative and executive branches of gov-
ernment.  The great danger in republics is that the majority will not
respect the rights of minority.31  This concern for minority rights was
important to the founders,32 so they created the courts.  In particular,
the courts do not stand for election.33  As such, they do not have to
react to public sentiment or majority rule, so they are an institution
uniquely divorced from public participation and charged with enforc-
ing principled positions and doctrines.34
29. Imagine, for instance, being able to tell the entire state of Utah that it is wrong
and that it must conform to your views of how society should work, regardless of
how many people agree and regardless of hundreds of years of social norms and
accepted behavior.  One could perhaps be forgiven for becoming a bit mesmerized
by that sort of power, instantly conferred by a robe and a gavel.
30. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
32. In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson stated that, “All, too, will bear in
mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to
prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess
their equal rights, which equal law must protect, and to violate which would be
oppression.”  Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (tran-
script archived at http://perma.unl.edu/X2DQ-5BKW).
33. See Waldron, supra note 27.
34. See Judge John E. Jones III, Inexorably Toward Trial: Reflections on the Dover
Case and the “Least Dangerous Branch,” THE HUMANIST (Dec. 17, 2008), http://
thehumanist.com/magazine/january-february-2009/features/inexorably-toward-
trial-reflections-on-the-dover-case-and-the-least-dangerous-branch, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/R5MQ-HKED (“Articles 1 and 2 [of the U.S. Constitution]
designate the legislative branch and the executive branch, respectively, as
majoritarian—they are subject to the will of the people; they stand in popular
elections.  But article 3 is counter-majoritarian.”).  In 2008, Judge Jones was
awarded the American Humanist Association’s Humanist Religious Liberty
Award at the World Humanist Congress in Washington D.C. See id.  He received
the award because of his 2005 ruling that the teaching of intelligent design in
public schools was unconstitutional. See id.  This ruling, as one might expect,
exposed Judge Jones to significant criticism (from numerous well-known public
figures, including Bill O’Reilly, Phyllis Schlafly, and Ann Coulter), which he
largely attributed to the nature of the courts’ role in our society.
The judicial branch protects against the tyranny of the majority.  We are
a bulwark against public opinion.  And that was very much done with a
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And, generally speaking, the courts have served that role well.
Courts routinely strike down popular laws or rules that do not pass
constitutional muster.  From school integration to abortion to criminal
defendant protection to the more recent Supreme Court decision on
“Obamacare,” the courts have consistently stood up for unpopular con-
stitutional principles.35  This is, given the discussion above about the
risks of majoritarianism, exactly what they are supposed to do—take
advantage of their insulated position, ignore popular sentiment, and
dispassionately apply fundamental values in spite of public
disapproval.36
And yet, the courts cannot enforce their own rulings.37  The obvi-
ous problem, then, is that the courts’ wonderfully protective impulses
will come to naught if the recipients of those rulings decide not to fol-
purpose, and I think that it really has withstood the test of time.  The
judiciary is a check against the unconstitutional abuse and extension of
power by the other branches of government.
Id.; see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 6 (1980) (“Despite the tendency of many classical and modern demo-
cratic political theorists to equate democracy with pure majoritarianism, ‘the at-
tempt to identify democracy with the unlimited power of majorities has usually
gone hand in hand with an attempt to include in the definition some concept of
restraints on majorities.’” (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 35 (1956))).
35. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (finding it
within Congress’s taxing power to include an individual mandate to purchase
health insurance); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(upholding the right of corporations to donate money to politics under the First
Amendment right to political speech); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (deciding
that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause occurred when different counties
counted votes in different manners); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (al-
lowing flag burning over a Texas statute outlawing it as a form of expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (agreeing with the petitioner that the death penalty was an excessive pun-
ishment for the crime of rape); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that
laws limiting a woman’s right to obtain an abortion before the end of the first
trimester are unconstitutional); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (revers-
ing petitioner’s conviction because he was not properly apprised of his Fifth
Amendment rights); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (declaring racial
discrimination in public education to be unconstitutional and requiring states to
desegregate “with all deliberate speed”).
36. Often, the minority groups who receive protection from the court are, by defini-
tion, not well-positioned to afford “the Court organized political support.” See
CHOPER, supra note 34, at 133.  These are the very situations, then, that the foun-
ders conceived of as requiring a neutral arbiter to buck public opinion. See id. at
132 (“Thus, in a recent statewide survey in Michigan, nearly four-fifths of those
polled believed ‘that the courts have gone too far in making rulings which protect
people who get in trouble with the law.’”).
37. See supra Part II.
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low them.38  Simply put, you cannot lead if nobody is following.  An
implicit contradiction exists at the heart of our American judicial sys-
tem.  On the one hand, the courts are removed from public purview, in
order to grant them the independence required to resist unjust majori-
ties.  On the other hand, that very independence and insulation means
that the courts cannot enforce the orders that act to resist majority
impulses.
Courts, then, walk a very fine line.39  They have to battle the pub-
lic40—but only when it is appropriate and feasible to do so.41  The key,
ultimately, is that the courts must work with society—they must
stand up for values but do so in a way in which society acknowledges
(even if begrudgingly) the legitimacy and justness of the courts’
actions.42
Before acknowledging this need for accommodation and intellec-
tual decorum, however, one must explicitly acknowledge the balancing
of interests discussed herein.  And commentators on our court system
tend not to do so.  Instead, they tend to adopt one of two views about
our judicial system and to thereafter advocate for either an active or a
restrained judiciary, never acknowledging the inherent difficulties
faced by our judges.  The next section identifies these specific points of
reference and argues both are flawed because they fundamentally ig-
nore the courts’ need to reconcile their dueling interests.
IV. DIFFERENT VIEWS OF HOW COURTS VIEW THEIR ROLE
These polar pressures placed upon the courts have resulted in two
distinct views of how courts both shape, and react to, society.  These
two views are often referred to as the “dynamic view” and the “con-
38. Refer again to Andrew Jackson’s famous quote: “John Marshall has made his
decision.  Now let him enforce it.” ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 14 (1987).
39. “[S]ociety not only will want to satisfy the immediate needs of the greatest num-
ber but will also strive to support and maintain enduring general values.”
BICKEL, supra note 14, at 27.
40. Id. (“[E]lected institutions are ill fitted, or not so well fitted as the courts, to [sup-
port and maintain enduring general values].  This rests on the assumption that
the people themselves, by direct action at the ballot box, are surely incapable of
sustaining a working system of general values specifically applied. . . . [M]atters
of principle, which require . . . more intensive deliberation [should not be submit-
ted to direct referendum].”).  This imperfection is as true with respect to elected
representatives as it is with the public in general. See id. at 39 (“It does not take
a lunatic legislature to enact measures that are irrational.  It only takes a legisla-
ture more than normally whipped up, very intent on the expedient purpose of the
moment, acting under severe pressure, rushed, tired, lazy, mistaken, or, forsooth,
ignorant.”).
41. See id. at 16–23 (discussing the problems caused by unelected judges invalidating
laws passed with majority consent).
42. See infra section IV.B; Tyler, supra note 28.
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strained view.”  They differ in how they view the courts’ level of activ-
ity and social prerogative.  In the end, though, this oppositional
paradigm is misplaced, and, in fact, both views belong on a spectrum
of behavior, on which all points ultimately derive from the courts’ need
to work with, and answer to, social mores.
A. The Dynamic Court View and the Constrained Court
View of the Courts
The first view of how the courts properly function is called the “dy-
namic court view.”43  This viewpoint stresses the protective quality of
the courts rather than their lack of enforcement power, and empha-
sizes their potentially proactive role in society.44  Here, courts are
viewed as “important producers of political and social change.”45  This
view ignores compliance issues and is based largely on politically un-
popular, and socially progressive, cases the courts have ruled upon.46
Courts, here, are viewed as the last line of defense for protecting
important values and rules, acting “when other branches of govern-
ment have failed to act.”47  In fact, courts are often seen as actively
opposing those other branches, as the Executive and the Legislature
collectively constitute a manifestation of the very sort of majoritarian-
ism that can lead to oppression of minorities and the suppression of
progressive causes.48
43. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
44. “[O]ne of the great strengths of courts is the ability to act in the face of public
opposition.” Id. at 22.  They can do so and advance important social change “even
when the other branches of government are inactive or opposed.” Id. at 2.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 35; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 2 (citing Brown and Roe
as cases “heralded as having produced major change”).
47. ROSENBERG, supra note 43 (“While officious government officials and rigid, un-
changing institutions represent a real social force which may frustrate popular
opinion, [socially progressive litigation] suggests that courts can produce signifi-
cant social reform even when the other branches of government are inactive or
opposed.”).
48. See id.  Something should be said here about the interplay between the concepts
of “progressivism” and “oppression.”  For a variety of reasons, which are generally
outside the scope of this Article, the idea of progress or “reform” is generally asso-
ciated with openness, minority rights, and a host of other wonderful things.  On
the other hand, the status quo tends to be associated with oppression and tyr-
anny and a host of other awful things.  However, “progress” is truly in the eye of
the beholder.  Every new law or regulation is progress in that it is a change from
the present state of affairs; but that does not mean that every new law or regula-
tion is an unalloyed good that serves to protect people from evil majoritarian im-
pulses.  If the current set of rules is superior (from the standpoint of the values
underpinning our constitutional guidelines), then progressivism would, in fact, be
a negative thing.  This can be seen throughout history, whenever majorities
change the laws to harm minorities—in such a situation, reform clearly is not a
positive or beneficial thing.  And, if such a situation were to present itself in
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Of course, the dynamic court view is not without criticism.  For
one, its supposed attractiveness (the ability of the courts to resist ma-
jority temptations) seems unlikely and contrary to the larger Ameri-
can system.49  To some extent, this vaunted view of the courts and
their powers may be due in part to the unduly high view of itself held
by the legal profession at large and its associated “mystification” of the
judiciary.50  More relevant here, this view also entirely ignores the
courts’ inability to enforce unpopular decisions.
The opposing view of the courts is the “constrained court view.”
This is summed up in Hamilton’s statement that the judiciary is the
“least dangerous” branch of government by design.51  Courts, lacking
in budgetary and physical powers (in Hamilton’s words, power over
either the sword or the purse) are inherently unable to produce either
political or social change.52  As such, the courts are intended to “do
little more than point out how actions have fallen short of constitu-
tional or legislative requirements and hope that appropriate action is
taken.”53
The constrained court view of the world recognizes the need for
social change and progressivism, and it “acknowledges the role of pop-
ular preferences and social and economic resources in shaping out-
comes.”54  It nevertheless discounts the power of the courts (or
society’s need for that influence), instead placing its faith in the for-
mal process of republican democracy.55  But this faith exposes the con-
strained court view to substantial criticism.  Importantly, it requires
one to essentially ignore the plain fact that “the formal process doesn’t
always work.”56
So we are left with two conflicting57 views of how one-third of our
government functions, with neither seeming to fully recognize or ex-
America, the courts would then be charged, not to defend unpopular progress, but
to defend unpopular status quo.  For purposes of this Article, however, it is conve-
nient (and well within the popular zeitgeist, particularly in the context of the
American academy) to conflate the concepts of progressivism and laudatory
values.
49. See id. (“Indeed, in a political system that gives sovereignty to the popular will
and makes economic decisions through the market, it is not obvious why courts
should have the effects it asserts.”).
50. See id. 2–3.
51. See id. at 3.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 336 (“Courts will . . . be ineffective in producing change, given any
serious resistance because of their lack of implementation powers.”).
56. Id. at 3 (“[S]ocial and political forces may be overly responsive to unevenly dis-
tributed resources.  Bureaucratic inertia, too, can derail orderly, processional
change.”).
57. The two views do not always clash. See id. at 4.  (“American legislatures do not
habitually threaten liberties, and courts do not regularly invalidate the acts of
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plain the basic underpinnings of how courts relate to society and the
other branches of government.  The question becomes, then, how to
reconcile the two views and what such a reconciliation means to the
larger issue of this Article.
The key, I believe, is to recognize that the two views are not, in
fact, opposed.  They are distinct, and they do acknowledge basic, in-
herent difficulties of the American system of government.  But they do
not, in truth, constitute separate arguments as to the role of courts.
Instead, they are points on the same spectrum of judicial efficacy.58
The choice, then, is not between strong courts and weak courts.  The
courts are both strong, because they very much have the ability and
power to affect society in a concrete manner, and weak, in the sense
that they cannot force society to accept those changes.  The courts,
then, can do much, but not on their own.  In short, they need the coop-
eration of society.
B. All Views Eventually Answer to Society
So the courts are designed to lead, but (due to their inherent limi-
tations) they cannot do so without the support of society.  This is a
deceptively simple statement, due in part to the wide variety of defini-
tions and connotations associated with the word “lead.”  Indeed, much
of this Article reduces to an argument about how best to view that
word.  As used here, the concept of judicial leadership means that
courts have a unique ability to articulate values and how those values
can shape and apply to social circumstance.  They are not, as the foun-
ders intended they would not be, tied to public opinion, and the values
elected officials or require certain actions to be taken.”).  But, of course, the really
interesting questions arise when the views do clash.  What occurs “when activist
courts overrule and invalidate the actions of elected officials, or order actions be-
yond what elected officials are willing to do”? Id.  If one were to strictly adopt just
one of these views, one would need to ultimately conclude either that courts are
“effective producers of change” or that they are largely impotent, doing “little
more than point[ing] the way to a brighter, but perhaps unobtainable future . . . .”
Id.
58. Of course, the idea of a “goal” in the judicial setting is, in and of itself, a freighted
concept.  Many believe courts must remain impartial arbiters of external values
and rules, a view well encapsulated by Chief Justice Roberts’s statement that a
judge’s role is to call “balls and strikes” as best he can.  Timothy P. Terrell, The
Art of Legal Reasoning and the Angst of Judging: Of Balls, Strikes, and Moments
of Truth, 8 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 35, 37 (2012).  As such, the idea that courts are
pursuing goals raises the specter of a judiciary abandoning its role and impermis-
sibly attempting to influence society with its extraordinary powers and place of
influence and seems to inherently reflect the “dynamic” role of courts.  Indeed,
this Article is largely intended to respond to situations where courts seem to have
done as much.  That said, the word “goal” can be safely used, in a manner not
likely to be controversial to anyone, to describe the courts’ charge to apply consti-
tutional and statutory principles, recognizing that even one’s perception of those
constraints is subject to interpretation.
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they espouse59 often lie outside the norm and run counter to presently
popular opinion.  On the other hand, they are not a power unto them-
selves, and the rules they create and the underlying values they es-
pouse must find purchase with the public.
The practicality within this formulation of the courts’ role is the
key to reconciling the dueling conceptions of our legal system encapsu-
lated by the seemingly alternative dynamic court view and con-
strained court view.  The courts are neither dynamic nor constrained.
They are either.  “[D]emocracies do live by the idea, central to the pro-
cess of gaining consent of the governed, that the majority has the ulti-
mate power to displace the decision-makers and to reject any part of
their policy.”60  But the courts can momentarily step outside of this
“ultimate power” and suggest alternatives to current practices.  If soci-
ety agrees, it will follow.  If not, then it will not follow, and the courts’
efforts will come to naught, regardless of the damage to minority
rights or society at large.61
Another way to put this is that the courts, at their best, should
demonstrate a constrained dynamism.  The Legislative and Executive
Branches are enormously volatile and often ignore or harm minority
interests.62  However, courts are not separate worlds unto themselves,
and their efforts to stand against the other branches (and the public
opinion they represent) has to be tempered by a deep and abiding re-
spect for the people they seek to lead.63  This modified view of the
courts leads to a more reasonable set of expectations for the judicial
branch.  Courts can change society, but only in a cooperative manner,
59. “Espouse” is also a word freighted with meaning and judgment.  Here, it merely
means the expression (in either an express or implied manner) of a value or set of
values that underlay a particular court ruling.
60. See BICKEL, supra note 14, at 27.
61. “[T]hat a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save;
that a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save; that in a society
which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that
spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.” Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Judge Learned Hand).  Indeed, “Under no system can the power of courts go far
to save a people from ruin.”  James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the Ameri-
can Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 156 (1893).
62. See supra note 35.
63. Seen this way, courts need to stand up to the public not by ignoring it but by
remaining steadfast in the service of underserved members of the public. See,
e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 2.  Of course, in a sense, this change of empha-
sis merely masks the fact that the judiciary will sometimes (perhaps oftentimes)
fail to effect the changes it would like implement.  To acknowledge this, however,
is not to admit defeat.  It is merely to acknowledge the actual nature of our sys-
tem, as prescribed by the founders. See id. at 13 (“The bounded nature of consti-
tutional rights prevents courts from hearing or effectively acting on many
significant social reform claims[ ] and lessens the changes of popular mobiliza-
tion.”); see also BICKEL, supra note 14, at 238–39 (acknowledging and discussing
the policy-making role of the judiciary).
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rooted in current facts and circumstances.64  They must act to harness
incipient social progress and to so act as a “reflection of significant
social reform already occurring.”65
This obviously is not the sort of rapid and directed progress that
many desire and believe necessary, but it is a holistic approach that
comports with our system of divided governance and authority and is
far more likely to protect constitutional values.66  In truth, this is a
deceptively simple diagnosis and recommendation.  It seems rather
simplistic to state that courts should “pay attention to society,” yet it
is anything but simple when contrasted against the role that courts
are ostensibly intended to play.  It is logically implausible to simulta-
neously acknowledge that courts are intended to stand against
majoritarian rule and to state that they must pay careful attention to
majoritarian sentiment.
What this Article is really articulating, then, is that the courts are
not the stolid protectors of constitutional values that so many perceive
them to be.67  They do serve a role in producing positive, progressive
64. “Judgment must ‘rest on fundamental presuppositions rooted in history,’ Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter wrote, ‘to which widespread acceptance may fairly be attrib-
uted.’ ” BICKEL, supra note 14, at 238.  This rises, at least in part, from the fact
that the only real enforcement mechanism possessed by the courts comes from
the legislative and executive branches, which are themselves answerable to the
public.  “Ultimately courts depend upon federal executive or legislative support in
order to see that judicial orders and policies are carried out.” Federal Remedies,
supra note 21, at 768.  And, “If the Court is seriously out of line with majoritarian
concerns, the other branches might refuse to support the Court.” Id. at 770.
65. See ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 6; see also BICKEL, supra note 14, at 239 (“The
Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of it, but it must lead opinion, not
merely impose its own . . . .”); id. at 251 (“The task of the Court is to seek and to
foster assent, and compliance through assent.”).
66. Compare Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (maintaining that the judiciary is crucial and essential
to social progress), with Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF.
L. REV. 751, 765–66 (1991) (“The Court is far more effective at vetoing a decision
of another government entity than it is at effecting social change on its own.”).
This Article, obviously, sides with the latter view.  Of course, this is not a binary
decision—it is not the case that the judiciary either will or will not exercise an
appropriate amount of “involved constraint,” as discussed herein.  Indeed, it ap-
pears likely that the courts have many methods for maintaining a proper amount
of remove and discipline. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitu-
tional Questions Promote Judicial Independence?, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031,
1035–36 (2006) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has employed avoidance techniques
selectively over the past three decades and often in categories of cases involving
controversial issues or ‘sensitive area[s] of social policy.’” (quoting R.R. Comm’n
of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941))).  However, a prolonged discus-
sion of the methods courts have used to properly (or improperly) avoid contro-
versy is outside the scope of this Article.
67. See supra Part III.
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change—but it is not, by design,68 an active role.  Instead, they are
meant to provide a venue through which society can effect the change
it is ready to accept.  Providing this venue takes wisdom and e´lan be-
cause the courts have to recognize when issues are ripe and when the
parties and circumstances before them provide sufficient context for
significant change, and they then have to reach out and take advan-
tage of those opportunities.  But, again, that is a receptive role—tak-
ing what society gives them and using that appropriately.
Importantly, this should not be seen as minimizing the place of the
judiciary.  Courts really do play a role in social change and the preser-
vation of constitutional values—but they are the instrument of these
things, rather than vice versa.  They should serve as a sort of “stress
test” to review and analyze issues to ensure that society is properly
positioned for recommended change, and, having done so, they then
serve the incredibly useful role of altering tradition-bound and bu-
reaucratic inertia.  The American politic is designed to be conserva-
tive.69  And that design has worked very well—it is rare and
exceedingly difficult, in our republican democracy, to put into place
significant changes without overwhelming public support (which is
generally desirable if one is worried about tyranny of the majority).70
68. Again, this runs contrary to much historical and contemporary thought regarding
our court system. See supra Part III.
69. One of the most challenging aspects within the democratic process is reaching
political compromise, even on popular issues. See Amy Gutmann & Dennis
Thompson, The Mindsets of Political Compromise, 8 PERSPS. ON POL. 1125, 1125
(2010) (noting that, while compromise is essential to our government, resistance
to compromise is also important despite it “stand[ing] in the way of change that
nearly everyone agrees is necessary”).  When a political system is designed to
force politicians with shifting mindsets to reach political compromise, results are
normally tedious and difficult to obtain.
[The] democratic process [requires] dual demands of campaigning and
governing . . . . To campaign successfully, politicians must mobilize and
inspire their supporters, . . . articulate a coherent vision distinct from
that of their opponents, and present their opponents as adversaries to be
mistrusted and ultimately defeated.  But to govern effectively, politi-
cians must find ways to reach agreements with their opponents; [the
same opponents they presented to society as mistrusting].
Id. at 1128, 1137.  In such a system, voters with opposing mindsets embrace slow
moving change because they “prefer to get nothing from an uncompromising rep-
resentative over getting something from [one] willing to hammer out judicious
compromises . . . .”  Russell Muirhead, The Political Virtue, 49 TULSA L. REV. 251,
260 (2013) (book review).  By contrast, when individual mindsets evolve into a
strict partisan divide, the governing process is slowed such that “it is difficult to
pass any legislation.” Id. at 252 (emphasis added).  At that stage, it is no longer
about compromise, but about “scoring symbolic points.” Id. at 253.
70. Each Congress considers at least 10,000 bills, and fewer than one in ten survive
both chambers. See Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Oct. 2, 2014), archived at
https://perma.unl.edu/NFW6-A6AQ.  Public support may help accelerate the pro-
cess, but the process remains slow by design.  For example, in 2014, despite grow-
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Courts can cut through all that—but only when their mandates will
be followed.  In this fashion, courts can, and do, serve the role the
founders intended.  However, if courts ignore these realities—if they
put their own desires and agendas above those of society—they run
significant risks.
V. WHEN COURTS EXCEED PERCEIVED SOCIAL NORMS,
THEY RISK THEIR OWN LEGITIMACY
Courts, then, walk a very fine line.  On the one hand, they are
charged with protecting minorities from harmful majoritarian im-
pulses and protecting constitutionally enshrined values; on the other,
they cannot stray too far from the norms established by the very ma-
jorities they are charged to police.  This difficulty is so great because of
the nature of human psychology and its natural reaction to being di-
rected to behave contrary to its inner desires.  And, while courts are
generally excellent at walking this fine line, examples abound where
they have gone too far in ordering the citizenry to ignore its own in-
stincts.  These examples uniformly support the thesis of this Article
that doing so is ultimately harmful to the legitimacy of the courts and
to the causes they seek to protect.
A. The Resistant Psychology of Contrary Directives
Courts must take care when attempting to affect public policy be-
cause their unique position in our government means they run a very
real risk of triggering public-wide pushback to policies society is not
ing concern over border security amid a soaring increase in the number of
“unaccompanied minors” illegally crossing into the country, virtually no legisla-
tive action was taken. See Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
southwest-border-unaccompanied-children (last visited Oct. 2, 2014), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/5LV9-NBZA.  Out of the 168 bills introduced by members of
the 113th Congress, only eight made it to the President, and almost all of these
did so in the form of consolidated appropriation bills, which had little to no direct
impact on imminent border concerns. See Border Security and Unlawful Immi-
gration, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/subjects/border_secu
rity_and_unlawful_immigration/6207#congress=113 (last visited Aug. 11, 2015),
archived at https://perma.unl.edu/CLK5-9RQX.  On the other hand, a genuine
(and bipartisan) outpouring of concern can effect change.  In 2013, the appropria-
tions bills for Homeland Security, and eleven other governmental agencies failed
to pass Congress. See Appropriations Legislation for Fiscal Year 2013, LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS (Apr. 10, 2015), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/approp/app13.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4AF2-L9GS.  After the public almost uniformly
registered its disdain, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014—outlining
the budget for all twelve agencies—passed through Congress in approximately
twenty-four hours and with overwhelming support. See Appropriations Legisla-
tion for Fiscal Year 2014, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ap-
prop/app14.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
9H32-V4TJ.
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yet prepared to accept.  Having no authority or ability to enforce any
edicts, they essentially have to hope that society will do so of its own
volition.  And one American ideological precept is that liberty means
no one can be told what to do when those instructions contradict
deeply- or strongly-held beliefs.  Indeed, such instructions are likely to
trigger a psychological reaction known as reactance, which substan-
tially undermines the efficacy of said instructions.71
Reactance is a negative response.  When a free behavior is
threatened, individuals may respond negatively, seeking to maintain
their prior behavior or perhaps attaching even more importance to the
behavior than previously.72  Courts can trigger this by ordering “soci-
ety” (the enormous composite of hundreds of millions of individuals) to
cease behaving in a particular manner.73  Such rulings can trigger
large levels of social reactance.74  This is particularly true given the
extremely controversial and weighty issues that our courts are repeat-
71. See generally JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (Leon
Festinger & Stanley Schachter eds., 1966).
72. Indeed, the more important a behavior is to someone, the greater the magnitude
of his or her reactance upon such free agency being removed. See id. at 15–16
(indicating that reactance “is defined as a motivational state directed toward the
re-establishment of the threatened or eliminated freedom, and it should manifest
itself in increased desire to engage in the relevant behavior and actual attempts
to engage in it”).  That is, the level of reactance one experiences is directly related
to the importance of the freedom to the individual. See id. at 16 (“Basically, the
magnitude of reactance is a direct function of (1) the importance of the freedom
which is eliminated or threatened, and (2) the proportion of free behaviors elimi-
nated or threatened.”).  Additionally, when there is loss of a single free behavior
(whether by a particular group or even of some other, visible group), people may
infer a related threat of removal of other free behaviors. See Jack W. Brehm,
Psychological Reactance: Theory and Applications, in 16 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER
RES. 72 (Thomas K. Srull ed. 1989).
73. Courts do not only prohibit behaviors, of course.  They can also issue affirmative
injunctions. See, e.g., Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitu-
tional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 315–16 (2009) (discussing affirma-
tive injunctions, which “order the offending government or official to take specific
action,” in the context of capital punishment).  However, even affirmative injunc-
tions are, for purposes of this discussion, essentially negative in nature; ordering
people to behave in a certain manner has the same effect as prohibiting them
from engaging in any other type of activity. See id. at 315 n.306 (“Though affirm-
ative injunctions have been historically disfavored, the distinction between nega-
tive and affirmative injunctions has less practical importance today, given courts’
willingness to grant affirmative decrees where some injunctive relief is war-
ranted.”).  For example, rather than forcing states to utilize a particular type of
capital punishment, a court can prohibit a host of procedures that do not comport
with the particulars of its chosen method.  Thus, no matter the precise nature of
the order, courts (when propounding public policy via mandatory social change)
risk triggering reactance by reducing freedom of choice.
74. See BREHM, supra note 71, at 4 (“Given that a person has a set of free behaviors,
he will experience reactance whenever any of those behaviors is eliminated or
threatened with elimination.” (emphasis omitted)).
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edly asked to address.75  Indeed, the more significant (and presuma-
bly necessary) the social change being shepherded by the courts, the
higher the danger of provoking this reaction.  “[H]ow effective law will
be in changing behavior depends on how central the behavior in the
life of the affected community.  In general, the more . . . connected to
other behavior—the more resistant the conduct is likely to be to ef-
forts to alter it.”76
Moreover, the danger of this negative reaction to judicial leader-
ship is likely to be significantly increased due to the judiciary’s dis-
tance from public purview.77  Reactance exists whenever people are
given orders contrary to their natural inclinations, but the effect is
heightened when the orders arise in an arena where individuals are
particularly invested in the idea that they should have freedom of
choice.78  Put differently, people’s reactions are shaped by their expec-
tations, and, when they expect that they will be able to make their
own choices, the surprise of having their agency taken from them will
cause a very strong, negative reaction that makes compliance un-
likely.79  Extrapolated to the subject of this Article, public reactance to
court rulings that ignore social norms is likely to be significant be-
cause the American public is accustomed to participating in the deci-
sion-making process (via direct elections).  The judiciary is outside
this participatory process,80 so there is a danger that the public will
view court mandates as “meddling”81 or illegitimate.82
75. Think, particularly, of court decisions that weigh in on issues such as race and
racism, gun control, abortion, gay rights, etc. See infra sections V.B–C.  The
courts are routinely called upon as the last resort for issues of this sort. See, e.g.,
Shew v. Malloy, 994 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Conn. 2014) (upholding the constitution-
ality of Connecticut’s assault weapon ban after recognizing the ban infringes
upon the Second Amendment); Shaw v. Shaw, No. 2D14–2384, 2014 WL 4212771
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2014) (per curiam) (requesting the Florida Supreme
Court decide whether a lesbian couple who married in Massachusetts had a right
to divorce), review denied, No. SC14–1664, 2014 WL 4403366 (Fla. Sept. 5, 2014);
Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2013) (striking down Arizona’s
law banning abortions after twenty weeks of pregnancy), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
905 (2014).
76. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 58 (1977) (quoting
Franklin Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, The Legal Threat as an Instrument of So-
cial Change, J. OF SOC. ISSUES, Spring 1971, at 33, passim).
77. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
78. See BREHM, supra note 71, at 7–8 (indicating that the legitimacy and justification
of interference with choice are important elements in determining the level of
reactance).
79. See id. at 4 (“The magnitude of reactance is a direct function of (1) the importance
of the free behaviors that are eliminated or threatened, (2) the proportion of free
behaviors eliminated or threatened, and (3) where there is only a threat of elimi-
nation of free behaviors, the magnitude of that threat.”).
80. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
81. This concern has a long history and continues apace. See Grant M. Hayden, The
Supreme Court and Voting Rights: A More Complete Exit Strategy, 83 N.C. L.
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Additionally, as discussed above, the judiciary is, in part, charged
with resisting majority impulses.83 This, too, means that the courts
will naturally provoke reactance.  “The importance of the freedom to
take a given position is a direct function of how closely that position
REV. 949, 950 (“By the 1990s, judicial intrusion into politics became a full-fledged
invasion . . . . [M]any observers viewed this sort of judicial meddling in political
affairs as quite troubling, [but courts] never seemed to get the message.”).  The
media continues to remind society of judicial meddling. See, e.g., Michael F. Can-
non, Decision to En Banc Halbig v. Burwell Is Unwise, Unfortunate, and Appears
Political, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michael-
cannon/2014/09/04/decision-to-en-banc-halbig-v-burwell-is-unwise-unfortunate-
and-appears-political/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DG6E-P7QN (“Today’s
decision by the D.C. Circuit to grant en banc review . . . is unwise and unfortu-
nate.  It has the appearance of a political decision . . . [and] consider[ing] the
dynamics surrounding the decision . . . [it is] hard to explain this decision [as]
anything other than political.”); Erik Voeten, Judges as Principled Politicians,
WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/
wp/2014/02/20/judges-as-principled-politicians/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
NRD4-95W8 (“Today there are few serious observers who deny that political fac-
tors play a role in shaping how judges (and the Court) make their decisions.  Only
judges continue to uphold the image of the judge who merely implements the
law.”); The Political Ginsburg, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2014, 7:13 PM), http://on-
line.wsj.com/articles/the-political-ginsburg-1404342819 (“Justice Ginsburg’s dis-
sent is so far removed from the legal reality that it doesn’t qualify as a judicial
opinion.  It is a political opinion whose purpose seems to . . . motivate Democrats
to turn out at the polls. . . . Justice Ginsburg’s [opinion] is a flight from the law.”).
82. Dr. Brehm provides the following example to illustrate the risk of perceived
illegitimacy:
If Mr. Smith says to Mr. Brown ‘You cannot have Betty for baby-sitting
this evening,’ when Mr. Brown might have wanted Betty, then Brown
should experience reactance.  It will be obvious, however, that Brown’s
reaction will be affected by the justification and/or legitimacy of Smith’s
interference.  If Smith adds that Betty’s mother has gone to the hospital
for an emergency operation, thus justifying the restriction, Brown will
not show a strong negative reaction.  If Betty is a young teenager and
Smith happens to be her father, then Smith can legitimately control
Betty’s activities and again, Brown is not likely to show a strong nega-
tive reaction.
BREHM, supra note 71, at 7.  Similarly, when Congress passes a law, voted upon
by an individual’s duly elected representative, that individual may experience
reactance—but she is likely to experience it to a greater degree when the Su-
preme Court issues a ruling (even if the law and the ruling have the same ulti-
mate effect) because she had no direct role in selecting the Supreme Court
Justices and so may see the ruling as less justified or legitimate.  This heightened
reactance is due, at least in part, to the fact that illegitimate or unjustified inter-
ference causes people to fear future interference. See id. at 8.  If one understands
an instance of interference, one can attempt to predict future such instances.  If,
on the other hand, one does not understand, then one may fear (justifiably) that
such interference can occur at any moment. See id. (“If Smith is not the father of
Betty and has no more legitimate control over her than does Brown, then Smith’s
attempted interference (without justification) also carries the implication that
Smith may well attempt similar interferences on future occasions.  From Brown’s
point of view, if Smith gets away with this, what can’t he get away with?”).
83. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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represents what one believes to be correct.”84  Yet again, then, the
very nature of our courts—meant to push back against norms held by
the public that are discordant with constitutional values—means that
the judiciary is almost certain to provoke reactance.85
This is, of course, harmful to the enterprise at issue.  If the judici-
ary provokes reactance, then it will ultimately undermine the very po-
sition it is advocating and so undercut the values it seeks to
promote.86  “When a person experiences reactance from having his
freedom to adopt his own opinion threatened, he will attempt to re-
establish his freedom by not taking the position advocated by the
communicator.”87
The real-world consequences of this are not difficult to perceive.
Return to the introductory material.  Presuming that Judge Shelby
believes that gay marriage must be mandated in order to honor Con-
stitutional requirements and so is a “good” thing,88 issuing a judicial
84. See BREHM, supra note 71, at 92.
85. See id. at 93 (“Whether or not these behavioral freedoms have importance will
depend upon whether or not they are closely tied to important values which the
individual holds.”).
86. This is a uniquely judicial challenge, given the courts’ lack of enforcement power.
Rules or regulations (or any other sort of legal mandate) will provoke reactance,
from whatever source, but the Executive and Legislative Branches have the abil-
ity to enforce their directives, regardless of public reaction (to an extent).  This
immediate and continual enforcement ensures that the directives are effected
and also begins to wear down and overcome resistance, particularly when that
immediately reinforced behavior conforms with broader social values:
Because people value approval, intrinsically or instrumentally, such be-
liefs influence behavior.  Updating one’s beliefs to account for the law, an
individual will infer the prospect of greater disapproval costs from be-
havior the law condemns, which gives the individual an incentive to obey
the law that is independent of the legal sanctions.
Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 389 (2000).
87. See BREHM, supra note 71, at 95.  Brehm explains:
[D]espite the pressure to change toward the position advocated by the
communicator, we can expect that when important freedoms of position
are threatened, the individual will . . . show boomerang attitude
change . . . . When an individual feels free to adopt his own position on
an issue, an attempt to force him to take a specified position or to influ-
ence him will threaten his freedom and arouse reactance.  He may re-
establish his freedom by avoiding opinion compliance or positive influ-
ence, and he can most clearly re-establish his freedom by moving away
from the advocated position.
Id. at 95, 117.
88. Unfortunately, this discussion may, for some people, raise the appearance of tak-
ing sides—of stating that gay marriage is “good” or “bad.”  This is probably a side
effect of an increasingly polarized political environment wherein people feel com-
pelled to take absolutist positions and attack any idea that is at all inconsistent
with such positions. See, e.g., Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of
Prior Military Regimes Towards a More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 97–98 (2003) (“Fractious and highly polarized poli-
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mandate is not necessarily a positive step toward furthering gay mar-
riage.  Indeed, if the order is made despite strong public opposition,
then society may experience a collective case of reactance and experi-
ence a “boomerang” of opinion, moving gay marriage ever further from
political reality.89  Interestingly, this has happened repeatedly
throughout American history, as courts have often “overstepped” so-
ties . . . cannot make progress unless citizens abandon absolutist positions and
make concessions and compromises whenever necessary to ensure social equilib-
rium and political stability.”).  However, this Article takes no position on any so-
cial or moral value or judgment.  The ultimate effect of the analyses and
recommendations discussed herein may well be that the courts should be more
circumspect or hesitant when it comes to judicially mandating social recognition
of gay marriage (or any other “cause”)—or it may also be that the courts should
seize the moment and mandate nationwide recognition of the same.  Whatever
the result, the idea is that such a conclusion should flow from a neutral perspec-
tive, removed from the personal opinions and prejudices of a relatively small
number of individuals who just happened to be appointed to a judgeship.  Indeed,
the thesis of this Article is that judges should pay attention to society’s beliefs and
act accordingly, given the constitutional issues and mores present before them—
not that any particular belief is “good” or “bad.”  And there is no real doubt that
the courts are not doing this, at present. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2710 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“By formally declaring anyone
opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority arms
well every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional defini-
tion . . . . The result will be a judicial distortion of our society’s debate over mar-
riage.”); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he only rationale
that the states put forth with any conviction—that same-sex couples and their
children don’t need marriage because same-sex couples can’t produce children,
intended or unintended—is so full of holes that it cannot be taken seriously.”);
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973–74 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (interpret-
ing the issue to be whether states can “discriminate against same-sex couples . . .
simply because the majority of the voters don’t like homosexuality (or at least
didn’t in 2004)”), aff’d, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Whitewood v.
Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (“We are a better people than
what these laws represent, and it is time to discard them into the ash heap of
history.”).  If, however, courts would remove themselves and instead focus on so-
cially acceptable reform, then much of the vitriol and absolutism present in soci-
ety’s view of the judiciary would fade, as various elements of society would no
longer view the courts as part of a larger game or contest, where the winner inva-
riably takes all, regardless of the issue of reactance and the present willingness of
the public to adopt such views. See CHOPER, supra note 34, at 133 (“All judicial
decisions produce losers, and many exercises of judicial review . . . find the losers
incensed over a burning issue of national moment with scant hope of change
through democratic processes.”).  Courts, in such a setting, “present[ ] a conve-
nient focal point for unhappiness and invective.” Id. at 134.  Perversely, then,
“defeat seems to be the greater energizer, even when the attackers have been
previous beneficiaries of the Court’s rulings.” Id.  Courts could avoid this if they
did not insert themselves into issues and instead attempted to marshal through
publicly tenable reforms in the context of constitutional mandates.  Doing this—
advancing important issues in accordance with the political will of society—is the
only legitimate and feasible way to effect concrete and meaningful reform.
89. See Oko, supra 88, at 95.
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cial boundaries and thereby done unintentional harm both to their
own clout and to the very people seeking their aid and protection.90
B. Examples of Courts Stretching Social Norms
Examples of the judiciary acting in spite of public will are legion.
This ubiquity provides ample opportunity to examine these rulings,
the public reaction to them, and the ultimate effect of these mandates
on both the values being espoused and the credibility of the court.
The first example that immediately comes to mind is Roe v.
Wade.91  As virtually everyone knows, Roe involved the issue of abor-
tion.  Therein, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a Texas
state statute that criminalized most forms of abortion, holding that
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment guaranteed a funda-
mental, implied right to privacy, which granted a variety of rights re-
garding abortion.92  To call this controversial would be an
understatement.  There was not broad public support for this ruling at
the time of its issuance.93  And, important here, there is no broad pub-
lic support for the ruling now.94  The fact that public opinion has not
changed is no coincidence.  The Supreme Court effectively forced the
public to accept abortion, something it was not prepared to do.95  This
90. Again, the response to this reactance, as propounded in this Article, is not diffi-
cult or overly complex.  Courts simply must take care to understand and take
account of public opinion and social norms.  Doing so avoids societal reactance
and makes public adoption of judicially-mandated values much more likely.
BREHM, supra note 71, at 97–98.  There, Dr. Brehm points out that, in order to
affect subjects’ opinions on a particular matter, those attempting to persuade
must take care to do so in a non-threatening manner.  The courts should take
heed of this by taking full account of public opinion prior to attempting to per-
suade via mandate, thus insulating themselves from being perceived as a threat.
91. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  By its very nature, this Article requires a careful considera-
tion of numerous controversial topics, but, again, the Article takes no actual posi-
tion on any of them. See supra note 88.
92. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  Specifically, the Court held it unconstitutional for the State
to interfere with a woman’s right to abortion up until the point of fetal viability or
the end of the first trimester. Id. at 163.
93. See generally KARLYN BOWMAN & JENNIFER MARSICO, AEI PUBLIC OPINION STUD-
IES: ATTITUDES ABOUT ABORTION (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Res. ed., 2014),
archived at https://perma.unl.edu/LR28-XWBA?type=pdf.  In 1975, two years af-
ter Roe, an April 1975 Gallup poll showed 21% people thought abortion should be
legal in all circumstances; 54% said legal under certain circumstances; and 22%
said illegal in all circumstances. Id. at 9.
94. See generally id.  In May 2013, a Gallup poll showed 25% thought abortion should
be legal in all circumstances; 54% said legal under certain circumstances; and
20% said illegal in all circumstances. Id. at 10.  Gallup has conducted over fifty
polls on this topic since 1975, and “the results are remarkably stable.” Id. at 9;
see also David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases?” Contraception, Abortion,
Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 299–300 (2000)
(indicating the effect of Roe—and its progeny—“remains unsettled to this date”).
95. See BOWMAN & MARISCO, supra note 93, at 9–10.
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triggered reactance.96  Being forced to accept something, particularly
something that ran counter to very strongly held beliefs and customs,
did not cause society to change its attitudes and positions.  Instead, it
caused a significant segment of society’s beliefs to harden in opposi-
tion97 to the Supreme Court’s progressive ruling.98
Of course, there are two sides to the issue, and many people sup-
port Roe.  That is not at issue.  What is at issue is how the subject of
abortion has festered on and on, never coming to any sort of resolu-
tion.  The thesis of this Article is that that lack of resolution and con-
tinuing discontent is, in fact, created by the very cases that are
seeking to create finality and shape society.  If the Supreme Court
would have taken more care to assess public attitudes and to draft its
opinion accordingly, the nagging issue of abortion would not be what it
currently is.  “A more restrained judgment would have sent a message
while allowing momentum to build at a time when a number of states
were expanding abortion rights.”99
Another example, again well known, is Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion100 and its progeny.  In Brown, the Supreme Court famously de-
cided an assortment of challenges to the prevailing practice of racial
segregation then prevalent in public schools.101  The Court found that
the doctrine of “separate but equal” was unconstitutional and was im-
permissible in the public school system.102  This reasoning eventually
extended to other areas of segregation and signaled a significant shift
in the Supreme Court’s view on racial inequality.103
96. See supra section V.A.
97. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
98. See Curt M. Hapward, The “Right to Die” Is Dead: A Constitutional Analysis of
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 165, 189 n.160 (1996) (cit-
ing well-known political pundit Charles Krauthammer for the proposition the ju-
dicial legislation in Roe has spawned decades of “social and political turmoil”).
99. Jason Keyser, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Roe v. Wade Ruling Flawed, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 11, 2013 10:12 p.m.), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/11/ruth-
bader-ginsburg-roe-v-wade_n_3261187.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8V
6G-DR9M.  Justice Ginsburg further indicated that a more thoughtful decision
“might have . . . denied opponents the argument that abortion rights resulted
from an undemocratic process in the decision by ‘unelected old men.’” Id. But see
ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 238 (“None of our time series on public views re-
garding abortion indicates that the Supreme Court decisions had an important
effect on [public] opinion.” (quoting Judith Blake, Abortion and Public Opinion:
The 1960–1970 Decade, SCIENCE, Feb. 1971, at 540) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
100. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101. See id. at 486–87.
102. See id. at 495; see also Jason Belmont Conn, Race Against the Machine: An Argu-
ment for the Standardization of Voting Technology, 12 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS.
& SOC. JUST. 181, 223–24 (2006) (discussing Brown and its after-effects).
103. See Conn, supra note 102, at 223–24.
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Important here, it also signaled a significant shift in the Supreme
Court’s view on injunctive relief.104  Prior to Brown, American courts
generally viewed their injunctive powers (grounded in, and made en-
forceable by, courts’ contempt powers) as limited and inapplicable in
the context of personal rights.105  In Brown, however, the Supreme
Court approved the use of injunctive relief as a far-ranging power that
could be utilized to address virtually any wrong.106  The courts have
since utilized this power to “engage in a substantial restructuring of
institutions whose ingrained practices violate civil rights.”107  This is
important because this shift signaled precisely the sort of mandate
with which this Article is concerned—it represents a direct incursion
by the judiciary into the basic norms and social fabric of society.  Nota-
bly, Brown is often hailed as a “triumph.”108  And there are probably
few people who would now argue with its intrinsic correctness or its
moral underpinnings.  Again, though, the thesis of this Article does
not relate to the underlying correctness of any particular decision.  In-
stead, it relates to the efficacy of the judiciary’s willingness to engage
in social diktat, and (despite the near unanimity of praise for, and be-
lief in the righteousness of, Brown) there is considerable reason to be-
lieve that the case was, in fact, deleterious to its ultimate aims.109
104. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.9(5) at 241 (2d ed. 1993).
105. See id.
106. See id.; see also OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (arguing that
civil rights litigation, such as Brown, ushered in a new and more powerful type of
injunctive relief). Brown is often referred to as a single case, but it was actually
an aggregate of cases that went through multiple rounds of appeals.  It was the
second Brown case that resulted in the most well-known injunction, wherein the
Supreme Court gave effect to the ruling of the first Brown case and ordered the
relevant federal courts to supervise and administer school desegregation. See
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
107. See DOBBS, supra note 104, § 2.9(5) at 241.
108. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 75–77 (Free Press 1990) (calling Brown a “great and correct decision”
that led to “the greatest moral triumph [that] constitutional law has ever pro-
duced”). But see Richard Posner, Appeal and Consent, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug.
16, 1999, at 36, 39 (arguing Brown “was a triumph of enlightened social pol-
icy . . . in the short term,” but in “a longer perspective . . . the decision seems
much less important, even marginal”); DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 20–28
(2004) (criticizing Brown for its ineffectiveness and claiming that a decision that
upheld “separate but equal” but required equalization and black representation
and involved additional judicial oversight would have been more effective).
109. See ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 157 (“I have found little evidence that the judi-
cial system, from the Supreme Court down, produced much of the massive change
in civil rights that swept the United States in the 1960s . . . . In this chapter, I
will marshall evidence suggesting that pro-civil-rights forces existed independent
of the Supreme Court and could plausibly have accounted for eventual congres-
sional and executive branch action as well as for Court action.”).
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Almost immediately after Brown, large portions of society began to
demonstrate reactance.  Ninety-six U.S. Congressmen from the south-
ern United States promised to maintain segregation through the use
of “all lawful means.”110  In addition, there was wide-spread pressure
on school boards to defy segregation, with many groups criticizing the
“communist-tainted” Supreme Court and utilizing the social rift ex-
posed by Brown as an opportunity to mobilize and energize their con-
stituents.111  This ultimately had an effect, with many schools simply
refusing to comply with Brown.112  Because courts have no intrinsic
enforcement power, this defiance had no real consequence.  Schools
that did not integrate, and that refused to comply with the Supreme
Court’s explicit order, continued to operate without consequence, and
moderate and liberal activists received very little support from any
quarter.113
Indeed, additional litigation sprang up surrounding the very ineffi-
cacy of Brown, further emboldening the opponents of progress and
compounding the futility of the Supreme Court’s orders. Cooper v.
Aaron114 was an attempt to force Arkansas, which had responded to
Brown with a strong manifestation of reactance, to desegregate.115
This is an instructive case because it demonstrates just how deleteri-
ous decisions can be when they occur prior to society’s willingness to
accept them.  Here, the Little Rock school district had actually begun
to desegregate based upon the Brown ruling, showing at least some
willingness to constructively engage civil rights issues.116  Reactance
intervened, however, as the state constitution was amended to “flatly
command[ ] the [state legislature] to oppose ‘in every Constitutional
manner the Unconstitutional desegregation decisions [in Brown and
its progeny].’”117  The Supreme Court reacted strongly, ruling that
school board members and school superintendents were agents of the
state bound by the Fourteenth Amendment and obligated to provide
110. See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 41 (1961).
111. See id. at 42.
112. See Michal R. Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown v. Board of Education:
The Genesis of the Warren Court’s Quest for Equality, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 863,
872–73 (2004).
113. See Peltason supra note 110, at 46–47. But see infra note 120.
114. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at ch. 5 passim (discussing the economic and
social changes that were positively impacting the civil rights movement during
the 1960s); see also id. at pt. 2 (“Abortion and Women’s Rights”) (making a simi-
lar argument about the inefficacy of judicial action regarding women’s rights and
the underlying social reasons for eventual change).
117. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. XLIV, repealed by ARK.
CONST. amend. LXIX).
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equal protection.118  It also reiterated its own authority, holding that
the federal judiciary is “supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected
by . . . the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature.”119
Those were comforting words, perhaps, to everyone except the school-
children of Arkansas, who waited in vain for the Supreme Court to
somehow enforce its “supreme exposition” in the face of violent resis-
tance.  In fact, nothing much occurred until President Eisenhower
sent in troops.120
Brown, then, did not directly accomplish much.  Years passed after
its ruling without significant progress, and the desegregation move-
ment stagnated during that time.121  It is unknowable whether signif-
icant progress would have been made in the Civil Rights Movement
during this time period in the absence of Brown,122 but that does not
mean that the Supreme Court’s decision was a boon to the movement.
To the contrary, there is significant reason to believe that the tooth-
less decree of Brown set back the civil rights cause because it forced an
issue before society was prepared to constructively approach it—and it
did so without a real plan or path toward enforcement.123  This is a
clear demonstration, then, of the judiciary staking out a progressive,
controversial position, thereby provoking a negative reaction (via reac-
tance) from society, and then not being in a position to counter that
negativity.124  Invariably, it leaves the position being advocated for in
118. See id. at 16.
119. Id. at 18.
120. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  President Eisenhower, the face of the
Executive Branch, did virtually nothing for three years to enforce Brown and only
became involved when he sent in soldiers to quell riots that had broken out in
Little Rock. See id.
121. See Belknap, supra note 112, at 872–75. Indeed, in 1958, all public schools
closed, leading to enormously segregated (private) academies—thus effecting pre-
cisely the opposite of what the court intended. See generally SONDRA H. GORDY,
FINDING THE LOST YEAR: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN LITTLE ROCK CLOSED ITS PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 33–83 (2009) (illustrating how the local government made continuous
attempts to get around federal court injunctions to open and operate private
schools for whites while displacing blacks).
122. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 157 (“While we can never know what
would have happened if the Court had not acted as it did (if Brown had never
been decided or had come out the other way), the existence and strength of pro-
civil-rights forces at least suggest that change would have occurred, albeit at a
pace unknown.”).
123. “The aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education had brought out the worst in the
South.” LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE,
1789–2008, at 249 (2009). It was not until the Civil Rights Act, which was passed
by a body much more reflective of public opinion, that national consensus began
to solidify. See id. at 250.  “The Court had been alone since Brown.  Now Con-
gress and the [P]resident offered assistance.” Id. at 251.
124. This is the equivalent of poking a bear, or kicking a hornet’s nest, with no plan as
to how to react.
430 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:401
a far worse position than it would otherwise occupy, with later propo-
nents having to work to make up the negativity created by the impo-
tently advocated position.
Indeed, the Brown ruling energized the opposition to the Civil
Rights Movement and provoked that opposition into utilizing its con-
siderable advantages to fight against integration.125  “[W]hile there is
little evidence that Brown helped produce positive [social] change,
there is some evidence that it hardened resistance to civil rights
among both elites and the white public.”126  Resistance to civil rights
grew in all areas, including voting, transportation, and others.127  The
case, rather than advancing minority rights, “unleashed a wave of ra-
cism that reached hysterical proportions” and “was used as a club by
Southerners to fight any civil rights legislation as a ploy to force
school desegregation on the South.”128  This had very extreme and sig-
nificant consequences.  For example, just days before the case was de-
cided, a House committee began consideration of a bill introduced to
ban segregation in interstate travel.129  After Brown, though, the bill
was no longer politically tenable and died prior to passage.130  Simi-
larly, “In hearings and floor debates on the 1957 Civil Rights Act,
Southerners repeatedly charged that the bill, aimed at voting rights,
was a subterfuge to force school desegregation on the South.”131
Ultimately, then, the judiciary, because it lacked an executable
plan, very concretely gave life to the segregationists it was attempting
to undermine.132  “By stiffening resistance and raising fears before
125. Legislators opposing integration could simply pass new laws allowing for new
appeals or for arguments for new claims. PELTASON, supra note 110, at 93 (“As
one segregationist said, ‘As long as we can legislate, we can segregate.’”).  Addi-
tionally, segregationists generally had more resources, so they generally had bet-
ter lawyers and controlled the direction and scope of litigation. See id. at 100.
Time and inertia were also on the side of the opposition.  School boards often
fought harder than students to delay integration, hoping for a political change,
and federal judges were sometimes reluctant to face the community opprobrium
arising from the segregationists in their social circles. See id. at 9, 95.  Of course,
these are advantages that flow from popularity—more money, more pressure,
more support. See, e.g., supra note 56.  And this is precisely why courts facing
important social issues should carefully consider the social circumstances.
126. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 155.
127. See id.
128. See id. (quoting ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 21
(1987)).
129. See id. at 155.
130. See id. (noting that Brown “probably contributed to the demise” of the bill (quot-
ing CATHERINE A. BARNES, JOURNEY FROM JIM CROW: THE DESEGREGATION OF
SOUTHERN TRANSIT, 94 (1983)).
131. See id. at 155
132. “The law is clear: the United States district court judge has ample power to com-
pel boards to desegregate.  Yet six years of litigation produced negligible re-
sults. . . . The law is on the side of the plaintiffs [the black students seeking
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the activist phase of the civil rights movement was in place, Brown
may actually have delayed the achievement of civil rights.”133  As a
result, segregation continued for years.134  It was not until society—
not the judiciary—was ready for change that change actually
occurred.135
These examples of dynamism gone awry (particularly the example
of Brown, as immense social importance has for so long been attrib-
uted to it) calls into question the entire concept of judicial activism.136
Again, the key is that courts must take care and carefully consider
public opinion and social norms when issuing these sorts of grand
mandates.  Failure to do so is counter-productive in a variety of ways.
Of course, as discussed above, it can prove harmful to the very issues
integration], but their opponents have most of the advantages.” PELTASON, supra
note 110, at 93.
133. See ROSENBERG, supra note 43, at 156.
134. See Sunstein, supra note 66, at 765 (“Ten years after [Brown], no more than
about two percent of black children in the South attended desegregated schools.
It was not until 1964, after Congress and the executive branch became involved,
that widespread desegregation actually occurred.  The Court is far more effective
at vetoing a decision of another government entity than it is at effecting social
change on its own.”).  As another example, consider Dallas schools, which contin-
ued to be completely segregated as late as 1960, six years after the original Brown
decision. See POWE, JR., supra note 123, at 248–51.  Also consider the case of
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Board of Education of Jefferson County., 162 F.
Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958), aff’d, 358 U.S. 101 (1958), which demonstrates the
“boomerang” effect even upon the federal courts.  In Shuttlesworth, the district
court dismissed black students’ claims that they were being denied the opportu-
nity to go to white schools.  Such a claim, seemingly in line with Brown, gained no
purchase with either the district court or the Supreme Court (which ultimately
affirmed the decision). See Shuttlesworth, 358 U.S. 101.  Of course, it is not possi-
ble to be certain about the reasoning behind the shift from Brown to Shuttles-
worth, but it is reasonable to wonder if the judiciary was stung by the strong
reaction to its earlier attempts and decided to step back and hope that public
opinion would “catch up.”
135. “The combination of all these factors—growing civil rights pressure from the
1930s, economic changes, the Cold War, population shifts, electoral concerns, the
increase in mass communication—created the pressure that led to civil rights.
The Court reflected that pressure; it did not create it.” ROSENBERG, supra note
43, at 169.
136. See id. at 156 (“Relying on the Dynamic Court view of change, and litigating to
produce significant social reform, may have surprising and unfortunate costs.”).
Another example is capital punishment.  The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) created enormous reactance, as shown by
contemporary polling, indicating that the Court’s attempt to force an abandon-
ment of the death penalty. See JEFF JONES & LYDIA SAAD, GALLUP POLL SOCIAL
SERIES: CRIME 2 (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/HFK6-55EG (comparing
polling responses from 1936 to 2013 to the question, “Are you in favor of the
death penalty for a person convicted of murder?”).  Approximately four months
prior to the Furman decision, fifty percent of those polled favored the death pen-
alty. Id.  Five months after the Furman decision, support for the death penalty
jumped by seven points. Id.  That number has not dipped below sixty percent in
thirty-one subsequent polls performed between 1972 and 2013. Id.
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being litigated.137  Additionally, though, it can also undermine the
very power of the judiciary to accomplish its job.  Recall from above
that the courts are intended to serve as a “bulwark” against
majoritarian impulses that would harm minority rights.138  A court
that repeatedly issues decisions that inflame opposition and that are
ultimately unenforceable, though, loses its power.139  As discussed be-
low, it becomes so weakened that it loses the respect of the majority
and thus becomes unable to accomplish its core purpose.
C. Legitimacy Undermined: The Fallout of Stretching Social
Norms
Ignoring the lessons discussed above will stimulate a vicious cycle.
The public, experiencing reactance, will rebel against rulings and ulti-
mately ignore, or otherwise disobey, them because of the judiciary’s
impotence.  This will, in turn, create an atmosphere of apathy, and
even disrespect, toward the courts, and, when a person or group be-
comes accustomed to ignoring orders, future orders have very little
currency.  The ultimate result of this cycle is a basic undermining of
the core legitimacy of the courts.
This argument is somewhat theoretical, but it finds strong support
in other areas of human history and social science.  George L. Kelling
and James Q. Wilson have popularized what is commonly known as
the “broken window theory,”140 and this theory describes the danger
of an impotent judiciary deaf to the potential consequences of reac-
tance well.  Using Stanford psychologist Philp Zambardo’s 1969 exper-
iments as a basis for their own study, Kelling and Wilson found that
“[u]ntended property becomes fair game for people for fun or plunder
and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such
things and who probably consider themselves law-abiding.”141  Effec-
tively, this means that “ ‘untended’ behavior also leads to the break-
down of community controls.”142
137. That is, far-reaching decisions regarding abortion can set back women’s rights,
and far-reaching decisions regarding school segregation can set back civil rights.
138. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Mark Tushnett, Against Judicial Review 11, 16 (Harv. Law Sch. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 09-20, 2009), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/8N2A-GTTB (noting the significance of judicial review and
arguing judges should only strike statutes when the democratic process is hin-
dered, but acknowledging the practice will probably remain until society suffers a
crisis requiring them to “understand why judicial review really does interfere in
important ways with their ability to govern themselves”).
140. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/B3AS-5BKM.
141. See id. at 3.
142. See id. at 4.
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This concept has applicability in a wide variety of circumstances.
Famously, Rudy Guiliani used this theory to change many of the prac-
tices of the New York City Police Department.143
The idea is that people—specifically potential criminals—take cues from their
surroundings and calibrate their behavior based on what they see.  If a city
block is litter-free and its buildings are well-maintained, people will be less
likely to litter or vandalize there, because they will sense that they will be
held accountable if they do so.  “Window-breaking does not necessarily occur
on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by window-breakers
whereas others are populated by window-lovers,” Wilson and Kelling write,
“rather, one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so
breaking more windows costs nothing.”144
The argument is fairly simple and pretty well-known at this point:
once people begin to ignore any rule, they will begin to ignore many
rules.  “Order begets accountability . . . disorder begets crime.”145
The applicability of this idea here is plain.  Court rulings that are
inconsistent with public sentiment will create a sense of reactance and
will be ignored.146  And, once a single ruling is ignored, it becomes
easier to ignore later rulings.  Akin to a broken window, an ignored
command inculcates a lack of respect for the law-giver, making it eas-
ier to ignore later rulings and commands.147  This becomes a nega-
tively self-reinforcing environment in that, eventually, society begins
to ignore all rulings,148 even those that are not highly controversial or
that do not incite reactance.  Once the public senses that there are no
consequences to ignoring the judiciary, and once it begins to do so on a
143. See, e.g., Lauren Kirchner, Breaking Down the Broken Windows Theory, PAC.
STANDARD (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/
breaking-broken-windows-theory-72310/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/E9
WW-ESJS.
144. Id.
145. Id. This precise nature of this theory, and the correct manner in which to apply
it, is not without controversy. See, e.g., Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Su-
preme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links Between Them
Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1374
(2010) (“[T]he practice of broken windows policing . . . [has] provoked considera-
ble . . . controversy”).  However, the core theory—that ignoring rules and laws at
any level has a deleterious effect on the rule of law—is sensible and applicable to
the discussion herein.
146. Or worse: such decision can actually provoke active rebellion. See supra sections
V.B–C.
147. This seems particularly acute in this context, given the implicit blessing of apa-
thetic Executive and Legislative Branches.  As discussed above, the judiciary re-
lies on these other two branches to provide real enforcement, when necessary.
The problem discussed here is only acute, then, when the Executive and the Leg-
islature do not do so.  However, when that occurs—when those two branches do
fail to enforce the law—the public receives an incredibly strong signal that they
can also ignore the law without consequence.  Again, the judiciary is simply in a
very difficult position.
148. Or, at least, to give them less credence than a healthy justice system would seem
to expect and require.
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recurring basis, a widespread lack of respect for the courts takes hold,
and the credibility of the justice system is irreparably undermined.149
This issue seems to be, if anything, even more serious in our cur-
rent, fractious political atmosphere.  In an environment where the va-
rious branches of government do not agree on many significant issues,
and where they do not seem overly concerned with the niceties and
technicalities of legal constraints, an overriding lack of respect for the
government could easily take hold.150  This means that the judiciary
must be more careful than ever to behave responsibly and in a manner
that takes account of social circumstances.
149. This issue is laced throughout our system of governance.
If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments
of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under
those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mocker; and
the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instru-
mentality of its own tribunals.
United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809).  Ignoring the law inev-
itably leads to lawlessness, with effects at all levels of society.  For an enormous
effect, simply consider the U.S. Civil War, provoked as it was by the Dred Scott
case. See, e.g., John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian, Little Rock and the Legacy
of Dred Scott, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1155 (2008) (“The principal recognition
accorded the Dred Scott case in the American mythos is its role in ‘precipitating’
the Civil War.” (citation omitted)).  But this has many smaller effects, as well,
and there are many examples of how this apathy towards the law occurs in our
everyday lives and how it contributes to lawlessness.  One need only peruse the
local penal code to find numerous examples of laws that are systematically not
enforced. See, e.g., The Law You Probably Ignore Every Day, ABC 13: EYEWIT-
NESS NEWS (Nov. 6, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/local&
id=9315437, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6XW2-XW93 (indicating that few
people follow the Texas law that prohibits drivers from driving in the left hand
lane unless for the purposes of passing another vehicle or making a left turn).
Many of these sorts of rules are ignored because they are not well known, of
course.  But the underlying problem is that they are ignored because they are not
enforced.  And when minor rules go unenforced, people begin to lose respect for
the system as a whole.  That is the danger for a judicial system staffed by judges
who do not ultimately care about whether anyone will follow their rulings.
150. See, e.g., Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar, 713 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2013).
Hornbeck and its progeny provide examples of just how direct and blatant official
lawlessness can become and how insidiously it can assert itself.  Here, the De-
partment of the Interior issued a second ban on drilling in the Gulf of Mexico,
following the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, after a federal judge struck down
the initial ban. See id. at 791.  This was after a judge that struck down the initial
ban had issued an injunction prohibiting the DOI from enforcing its moratorium
on drilling. See id. at 790.  The government ignored that injunction and at-
tempted to enforce its second ban, so the court held the DOI in contempt. See id.
at 793.  On appeal, the 5th Circuit sided with the DOI on a technicality, thereby
effectively letting the governmental agency ignore the lower court. See id. at
795–96.  This is problematic, for all the reasons discussed herein.
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D. A Contemporary Narrative
So what can courts do?  The thesis of this Article is that the judici-
ary must maintain a high level of regard and respect for public opin-
ions and always be wary of the social currents from which the issues
before them arise.  Nevertheless, they are still charged with protecting
the vulnerable members of the citizenry from the capricious choices of
the majority.  They cannot simply abandon this charge, so what are
they to do?
Generally, as discussed above, courts must attempt to interact
with the public in a cooperative manner that leads society in a positive
direction but that is simultaneously rooted in current social norms
and beliefs.151  They cannot abandon their charge to protect constitu-
tional values and those who require protection, but they have to work
with society in a manner society is willing to accept, rather than sim-
ply attempting to rule by toothless fiat.152  In this manner, the courts
can walk the fine line between leading and following—of balancing
the gun and the salute—and ultimately fulfill their objectives.  Fail-
ure in either direction (either failing to lead or being too commanding)
will lead to a punchless judiciary that is ultimately unable to aid or
protect society.153
But this articulation is too easy.  Based upon the balance of this
Article, it is an accurate assessment, but what good is an accurate
assessment that is too simple to meet the complex conflicts faced by
the courts?  The interesting question is how this generic proposition is
to be applied in the real world.  Of course, the innate complexity of the
social and legal issues consistently faced by the courts makes answers
difficult, but perhaps some insight can be gained by casting this ques-
tion in the context of the issue raised in the introduction, and that
which spurred the author’s interest in this Article—that of gay mar-
riage, as addressed by Judge Shelby in Utah.
Recall that Utah has, not surprisingly,154 had a very strongly con-
servative view of this issue.  Again, as recently as just ten years ago,
over 65% of Utah voters approved a state constitutional amendment
that effectively prohibited gay marriage.  So what should Judge
Shelby have done?  This Article argues that, in the face of such over-
whelming opposition, he probably should not have done anything.
Based on the discussion above, a judicial order directing nearly two-
thirds of the public to disregard strongly-held opinions on a sensitive
topic simply is not a good idea.  It is ultimately inconsistent with the
151. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
152. See id.
153. See supra sections V.B–C.
154. A majority of Utah’s population belongs to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, a socially conservative church that has repeatedly taken a strong po-
sition against gay marriage.
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courts’ role—which is to provide protection to minorities, from majori-
ties, consistent with constitutional values—because this leap actually
undermines the judiciary’s ability to do so.155  And the facts bear that
out here.
Immediately after Judge Shelby’s ruling, the State of Utah began
to pursue its appeal with vigor.156  The decision became national news
and, to some extent, the foci for those who oppose gay marriage, with
both Utah citizens and outside groups contributing money and effort
into defeating legally mandated gay marriage.157  Prior to the ruling,
there could be no doubt that public perception of gay marriage was
changing.  One recent study shows “[a] plurality of Utahns agree that
same-sex couples should be allowed to marry in Utah.”158  Since the
155. See supra section V.C.
156. In denying the State’s motion for a stay three days after the court announced its
opinion, Judge Shelby explained:
The court had a telephone conversation with counsel from both parties a
few hours after it issued its Order.  The State represented to the court
that same-sex couples had already begun marrying in the Salt Lake
County Clerk’s Office and requested the court to stay its Order of its own
accord.  The court declined to issue a stay without a written record of the
relief the State was requesting, and asked the State when it was plan-
ning to file a motion.  The State was uncertain about its plans, so the
court advised the State that it would immediately consider any written
motion as soon as it was filed on the public docket.  The State filed a
Motion to Stay later that evening.
Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-CV-217, 2013 WL 6834634, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 23,
2013).  After the stay was denied by Judge Shelby, the State immediately filed
another application for stay, but this time with the U.S. Supreme Court.  On Jan-
uary 6th, 2014, the Supreme Court granted a temporary stay to allow the appeals
process to run its course.  Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893, 893 (2014).
157. Restore Our Humanity, the nonprofit group behind the Amendment 3 challenge,
raised over $130,000 within six months of Judge Shelby’s decision.  Ben Winslow,
Federal Appeals Court Has Another Big Same-Sex Marriage Case Pending, FOX
13 SALT LAKE CITY (June 26, 2014, 10:16 PM), http://fox13now.com/2014/06/26/
federal-appeals-court-has-another-big-same-sex-marriage-case-pending/com-
ment-page-1/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/DU6W-AJSE.  The group is
targeting individual members of society.  They teamed with 145Fund.org to
launch a fund seeking $5 from one million people to enable “grassroots participa-
tion” in the fight for marriage equality. 145Fund.org Launched to Fund
Landmark Lawsuit Against Marriage Discrimination, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2014
6:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/article/2014-04-10/ad63fzNri1uk.html,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8792-T57Q.  On the other side, a Utah
lawmaker proposed a statewide “Marriage Defense Fund” that taxpayers could
donate to when filing taxes. Lawmaker Wants Donations to Anti-Gay Marriage
Fund on Tax Forms, N.Y. POST (Jan. 30, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/01/30/
lawmaker-wants-donations-to-anti-gay-marriage-fund-on-tax-forms/, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/FAC9-MZWA.
158. JOEL BENENSON & AMY LEVIN, RECENT UTAH POLL RESULTS 1 (Benenson Strategy
Grp. 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/6MAS-ZTRA.  The report goes on to
suggest the support arises from the absence of any negative impact on other mar-
riages, and “70% of Utahns have a close friend or family member who is gay.” Id.
Another group conducted a study a year earlier comparing support from 2004 and
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ruling, however, Utah succeeded in temporarily staying the decision
by pouring significant time and resources into the effort.159  At the
time of this Article, that effort has failed—but the question is whether
public attitudes will continue to evolve or will become cemented in
place due to judicial intervention.
These are the wages of reactance.  Judge Shelby was evidently ex-
cited about being a civil rights pioneer,160 but he may well have
pushed those subject to his decisions too far, with potentially disas-
trous results.161
2012, and found an increase of support from 25% to 36%. See ANDREW R. FLORES
& SCOTT BARCLAY, WILLIAMS INST., PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES BY STATE 6 (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/YS4A-JAD6.  Mov-
ing from 36% to a plurality in such a short time represents a significant change.
159. It is unclear how much was specifically spent on staying Judge Shelby’s ruling,
but the entire process of fighting Kitchen v. Herbert is believed to have cost any-
where from $600,000 to $10 million.  The Attorney General originally estimated
the appeals process would cost around $2 million.  Brooke Adams & Lindsay
Whitehurst, Supreme Court Halts Gay Marriages Pending Appeal, THE SALT
LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2014, 11:47 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/57357406-
78/court-utah-state-stay.html.csp, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3BE4-LVUX.
Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General announced it had hired outside counsel
to handle the 10th Circuit appeal at a capped fee of $300,000.  Press Release,
Sean D. Reyes, Utah Office of the Attorney Gen., Outside Counsel to Assist with
Kitchen vs. Herbert Announced (Jan. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
S4HV-JUZL.  In October 2014, after learning the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari, the Attorney General announced the state paid a total of $600,000 towards
the case.  Marissa Lang, Utah Clerks Issue Marriage Licenses to Same-Sex
Couples, THE SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 2, 2015 11:24 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/spe
cialreports/1676131-155/marriage-sex-court-utah-states-monday, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/6AAL-3GAT.  However, a state senator previously indicated
Utah “committed around $10 million” to the Kitchen v. Herbert fight.  Mori Kess-
ler, Appeals Court Denies Utah’s Request to Stay Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riages, ST GEORGE NEWS (July 11, 2014), http://www.stgeorgeutah.com/news/
archive/2014/07/11/mgk-appeals-court-orders-utah-recognize-sex-marriages/#.V
MMS_-ktGUm, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/CG2M-39M5 (quoting a state-
ment issued by State Senator James Dabakis).
160. See Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1202 (D. Utah 2013) (“[T]he State
argues that an individual’s right to marry someone of the same sex cannot be a
fundamental right.  But the Supreme Court did not adopt this line of reasoning in
the analogous case of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).” (citations omitted)).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Loving struck down state laws banning interra-
cial marriages.  However, Judge Shelby analogized Loving to same-sex marriage
on three occasions. See id. at 1194, 1202, 1206.  He used this comparison to con-
tend “the State’s unsupported fears and speculations are insufficient to justify
the State’s refusal to dignify the family relationships of its gay and lesbian citi-
zens . . . . The Constitution therefore protects the choice of one’s partner for all
citizens, regardless of their sexual identity.” Id. at 1216.  It is hard not to per-
ceive, in Judge Shelby’s opinion, a desire to be remembered as similarly
“pioneering.”
161. Or, at least, disastrous to those desiring the progressive view of marriage.  Utah
Governor Gary Herbert, for example, decried this ruling as ignoring the will of
Utah and its citizens. See Press Release, Utah Governor Gary Herbert, State-
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This issue is far from resolved, of course. Kitchen v. Herbert was
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 25, 2014.162
The majority expressly rejected the will of the people, stating that
“protection and exercise of fundamental rights are not matters for
opinion polls or the ballot box.”163  The dissent, however, warned
judges “should resist the temptation to become philosopher-kings, im-
posing our views under the guise of constitutional interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”164  Other courts have struggled with
this tension, as well.165
ment on Federal Court Ruling (Dec. 20, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
PW33-2SFP.  Similar rulings have resulted in concern of judges trumping the
“will of the people.” See, e.g., John Lyon, Legislators Adopt Resolution Opposing
Judge’s Ruling on Gay Marriage, ARK. NEWS (June 20, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://
arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/legislators-adopt-resolution-opposing-judge-s-
ruling-gay-marriage, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/87KB-7H9R (discussing
legislative efforts to adopt a resolution overturning state court decision on same-
sex marriage); Ben Johnson, Utah Judge Strikes Down State’s Marriage Amend-
ment: Could Force Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ Nation-Wide, LIFESITE (Dec. 23, 2013,
5:59 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/obama-appointed-judges-ruling-in-
utah-could-overturn-every-state-marriage-p, archived at https://perma.unl.edu/
5EF8-TRFE (quoting Brian Brown, president of the National Organization for
Marriage) (calling the Kitchen holding “a travesty of justice . . . [and one that]
should concern every American who cares about the rights of citizens and their
involvement in determining the laws that govern us”).
162. See 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
163. Id. at 1228.
164. Id. at 1240 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on seven cases from the
Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, including Kitchen v. Her-
bert. See Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (declining to consider Utah
marriage law); Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (declining to consider
Oklahoma marriage law); Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (declining to
consider Indiana marriage law); Walker v. Wolf, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (declining
to consider Wisconsin marriage law).  The Court also rejected three cases con-
cerning Virginia’s marriage laws.  McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014);
Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014); Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014).
Not one of these cases stood behind the democratic process, and each overturned
same-sex marriage bans.  In Baskin v. Bogan, Posner, writing for the Seventh
Circuit, struck the bans in Indiana and Wisconsin, noting that “[m]inorities tram-
pled on by the democratic process have recourse to the courts.”  766 F.3d 648, 671
(7th Cir. 2014).  In an opinion questioning the same-sex marriage ban in Virginia,
the Fourth Circuit contended “the people’s will is not an independent compelling
interest that warrants depriving same-sex couples of their fundamental right[s].”
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir. 2014).  Exactly a month after the
Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutionality of same-sex marriage
bans, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a 2-1 opinion upholding
same-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Tennessee, Michigan, and Kentucky.  DeBoer v.
Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  The court
recognized an overwhelming number of voters in each state supported the bans.
Id. at 409–10.  It should be for the voters to decide when societal values have
evolved. See id. at 416 (“A principled jurisprudence of constitutional evolution
turns on evolution in society’s values, not evolution in judges’ values.”).  Had
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Regardless of how the Supreme Court resolves this iteration of the
conflict between the courts and the public, however, the courts should
take care to consider the generic articulation, above: The judiciary
must pay attention to its public.  Of course, this is not an absolute
proposition.  If Judge Shelby could credibly claim that society was
ready for his marching orders, then his ruling would be sound.  It is
difficult to be certain what would justify such a conclusion, in the face
of such overwhelming opposition, but it is conceivable.166  A corollary
to that is perhaps that judges would do well to be cognizant of their
geographic reach.167  It is difficult, if not impossible, for judges in rela-
tively isolated areas to credibly evaluate larger social sentiment.  For
example, the District of Utah is relatively small, covering just 82,000
square miles and with a population of 2.8 million residents.168  And
yet Judge Shelby issued an order that conceivably affects hundreds of
millions of people and that should only be issued if those hundreds of
millions of people are ready for it.  This suggests that district courts,
in exercising caution regarding public opinion, should be very, very
careful to not overstep their bounds, as it is far more likely that higher
courts have a better vantage point to make such decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the thesis presented above is not terribly complicated.
The judiciary must be ever aware of society’s temperature, as courts
lack the ability to enforce their orders, and unwelcome, unenforceable
orders tend to provoke resistance and hostility.  This simplicity is de-
ceiving.  The courts walk a very fine line, having to effectively tame a
majority that it cannot control.  Compounding the problem is the fact
Judge Shelby, and others similarly situated, respected the political process,
“thirty-one States would continue to define marriage the old-fashioned way.” Id.
By ignoring the voice of democracy, judges “perpetuate the idea that the[y are
the] heroes in these change events.” Id. at 421.  As such, there was a finally a
split among the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
January 16, 2015, for all four Sixth Circuit cases.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 1039 (2015); Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015); DeBoer v. Snyder, 135
S. Ct. 1040 (2015); Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. Ct. 1041 (2015).  On June 26, 2015,
the United States Supreme Court overruled the Sixth Circuit cases and ruled
same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional in all fifty states. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct.
2584.
166. Assume, for instance, that public opinion was breaking strongly in a particular
direction (as is perhaps the case here). See supra note 158 and accompanying
text.  In such a situation, extant opposition would perhaps not be a barrier, as
momentum and time would be on the side of the progressive ruling.
167. HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 60 (“In general, it has been thought that court deci-
sions would be more effective if there were fewer target populations.”).
168. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, About the District of Utah, U.S. ATTYS. OFF., http://www
.justice.gov/usao/ut/about.html (last updated Mar. 13, 2015), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/VU7D-TSGW (noting the physical size and 2011 population esti-
mate of the district).
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that missteps are likely to backfire, creating more resistance and hos-
tility than originally existed.  Much thought and analysis, then, must
go into controversial decisions to ensure that they accurately assess
the direction of public sentiment.  If, however, courts do this, they
have the unique ability to help society seize opportunities for growth
and change and to guide the public in constructive and positive ways.
